HPLA Journal @hpla@fediphilosophy.org

HPLA currently has two CfPs for special issues:

* New Social Perspectives in Medieval (https://fediphilosophy.org/web/@hpla/109998353890439551)
* Metaphilosophy in History (https://fediphilosophy.org/web/@hpla/109948693469579886)

In addition, HPLA always accepts submissions on any subject in the history of philosophy for its open issues.

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📄 New article in advance access:

Christopher Erhard, "Husserls Irreversibilitätsargument gegen den Materialismus"

Abstract:
In this paper I offer a reconstruction of one of Husserl’s various anti-materialist arguments. #Husserl hints at this argument in Ideas II & III where he exposes essential differences between mental and material reality (Realität). At its core, Husserl claims that mental entities by their very essence can never be in the same qualitative condition at different times. By sharp contrast, for purely material or physical entities such a cyclical development is not essentially excluded. Accordingly, I will speak of Husserl’s argument from irreversibility. I argue that this argument is modal in nature, and that it can be used to make a case against materialism based on the necessary supervenience of the mental on the physical. My primary goal is to elucidate this argument, and to offer a logical reconstruction using basic modal logic and contemporary notions of supervenience. I conclude that Husserl’s argument is formally valid, and that it can even held to be sound, although the premise regarding the necessary irreversibility of the mental requires further clarification.

https://brill.com/view/journals/hpla/aop/article-10.30965-26664275-bja10064/article-10.30965-26664275-bja10064.xml

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📄 New article in Advance Access:

Charles Girard, '“No Change for Relatives”: The Strategy of Initial Presence'

Abstract:
In the Physics, #Aristotle says that there is no change associated with the category of relatives. In this paper, I examine a widespread but neglected strategy that medieval thinkers use to understand Aristotle’s claim. According to this strategy, which I label initial presence, if there is no change in the category of relatives, it is because the relation-properties are already present in their subject as soon as the properties on which relation-properties are founded exist. Appreciating the importance of this strategy is crucial not only for understanding medieval theories of relation but also for assessing the credibility of arguments used in the secondary literature to interpret medieval texts, in particular a well-known passage from Thomas Aquinas’s commentary on the Physics.

https://brill.com/view/journals/hpla/aop/article-10.30965-26664275-bja10065/article-10.30965-26664275-bja10065.xml

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New article in Advance Access:

Emanuele Costa, "#Spinoza and the Hybrid Distinction of Attributes"

Abstract:
In this paper, I address the issue of what kind of distinction separates the attributes of Spinoza’s substance. I propose to consider the distinction between attributes neither as a real distinction nor as a pure distinction of reason. Instead, I ventilate the alternative of understanding attributes as distinguished by a hybrid distinction, of which I trace the development during the Medieval and Early Modern eras. With the term hybrid, I capture distinctions which are neither a real distinction between substances or real accidents; nor a pure distinction of reason, produced or fabricated by the intellect. I shall argue that Spinoza’s notion of attribute falls under the scope of a hybrid distinction, thus sidestepping the longstanding debate between objectivism and subjectivism.

https://brill.com/view/journals/hpla/aop/article-10.30965-26664275-bja10063/article-10.30965-26664275-bja10063.xml

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📢 Call for papers: New Social Perspectives in Medieval #Philosophy

Guest editors: Jenny Pelletier and Ana María Mora-Márquez (both University of Gothenburg)

In the past forty years, the analytical tradition in philosophy has experienced a social turn with the result that areas such as social epistemology, social philosophy of science, and social ontology are at present some of the most innovative and vibrant. We have reason to think, however, that this recent turn must have had a precedent in past philosophical traditions where the social was part and parcel of philosophical discussions and elucidations. In particular, we believe that the late Middle Ages is one of those past traditions.

With this in mind, we have proposed a special issue to the Brill journal History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis, with a focus on the social in medieval philosophy. The journal has accepted to publish the special issue in a rolling model in which articles appear online first upon acceptance after peer review.

We welcome abstracts that shed light on aspects of medieval philosophy where the social is crucial, particularly in the areas of epistemology, philosophy of science and social ontology or metaphysics. The following is a list of possible topics:

* For social epistemology and philosophy of science: the roles of testimony, trust, epistemic authority, peer disagreement, social objectivity and rational criticism (for instance the role of fallacies in critical examination) in the production and dissemination of (scientific) knowledge; pragmatics in reasoning; the sociology of medieval science.

* For social metaphysics: the nature and production of social entities (or objects or facts) such as social groups (e.g. religious orders, corporations, political communities, the family, nations), money, property, artifacts, and so forth; the role of language and the will in their production; the role of obligations, norms, and practices in structuring and individuating social groups; the possibility of non-human social groups.

Submission information
Please email an abstract of 500-800 words and a short CV by 30 June, 2023 to either of us at:

jenny.pelletier@gu.se or ana.maria.mora.marquez@gu.se

We plan to organize a workshop in early 2024 to discuss full drafts of the contributions with a final deadline for submission in March 2024.

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📢 Call for papers: #Metaphilosophy in History

Guest editors: Catherine Dromelet and Willem Lemmens (both University of Antwerp)

What is #philosophy? How does a philosopher proceed and what goals do they pursue? How do they distinguish between good and bad philosophy? Being interested in such questions is sometimes labeled as metaphilosophy. Recent publications on metaphilosophy are essential references when it comes to these questions. The prevailing tendency in these and related contributions is to address methodological and systematic problems relevant in contemporary discourses, while the historical context of metaphilosophical issues is typically ignored (with few exceptions showing, for instance, historical affinities within the Marxist tradition). The present issue aims to address this hiatus. The meaning of the word ‘philosophy’ has undergone profound transformations over time. What we consider ‘modern science’, for instance, emerged in early modern times within the bounds of what was then considered ‘philosophy’. Similarly, ‘experimental philosophy’ had a specific meaning in the early modern period: it came close to what we would call ‘empirical science’, but today the latter means largely an empirical survey of conceptual intuitions, while the former has now a very different meaning for several contemporary philosophers. These are just conspicuous illustrations of how the meaning of the word ‘philosophy’ has been changing over time. The special issue ‘Metaphilosophy in History’ aims at surveying the most significant changes in the self-conception of philosophy and at introducing historical insights and considerations into contemporary discourses on metaphilosophy. It provides an opportunity to focus on specific authors and schools of thought, to highlight distinctive aspects and phases in the evolution of the self-understanding of philosophy. So, while much of metaphilosophical work so far has been concerned with systematic issues, our aim is (1) to provide a historical perspective on metaphilosophical enterprises through a reconstruction of the self-conception of philosophy up to the very recent past, and (2) to infuse contemporary problems of metaphilosophy with historical consciousness and sensitivity.

For this special issue of History of Philosophy and Logical Analysis we are looking for articles (up to 10.000 words) that seek to provide a new, diversified outlook on historically informed metaphilosophy, based on in-depth original research. The questions that we are interested in include: Did metaphilosophy play any important role in the past philosophers' agenda? If they held metaphilosophical views, did their philosophical practice follow them? Was there more agreement on the metaphilosophical level than in the argumentative practice, or vice versa? Papers should focus on specific historical figures, presenting their case as illustrative of a more general tendency or movement. This is less pressing in the case of very central figures like #Aristotle, #Hegel, #Wittgenstein, etc., but it is desirable in the case of less influential authors.

Submission deadline:
The articles will appear in HPLA 27.1 (2024)

Articles should be submitted by September 30, 2023, via Editorial Manager (see https://brill.com/view/journals/hpla/hpla-overview.xml?contents=artsub)

Please direct any questions to the guest editors at

catherine (dot) dromelet (at) uantwerpen (dot) be
willem (dot) lemmens (at) uantwerpen (dot) be

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OPEN ACCESS

Lara Scaglia, "Review of: 'Kant’s Transcendental Deduction of the Categories', written by Kenneth R. Westphal"

https://brill.com/view/journals/hpla/25/2/article-p412_8.xml

OPEN ACCESS

Thomas A. Corbin, "Review of: 'Foundations for a Humanitarian Economy: Re-thinking Boethius’ Consolation of Philosophy', written by William D. Bishop"

https://brill.com/view/journals/hpla/25/2/article-p405_7.xml

Simon Dierig, "Das Cogito als Fundament des Wissens"

Abstract:

In this essay, I discuss three readings of Descartes’ Meditations. According to the first reading, “I exist” is for Descartes the foundation of our knowledge. This reading is dismissed on the grounds that, in his view, as long as God’s existence is not proven there is a good reason to doubt this proposition. Proponents of the second reading claim that there are two kinds of Cartesian knowledge: perfect and imperfect knowledge. The meditator has imperfect knowledge of “I exist” before God’s existence is proven. Subsequently, she acquires perfect knowledge of various metaphysical theorems. This reading is repudiated, too. I argue for a third reading, according to which “I think” – and not “I exist” – is the foundation of our knowledge.

https://brill.com/view/journals/hpla/25/2/article-p375_6.xml

Emanuele Costa, "David of Dinant and Negative Panentheism"

Abstract:

During the Middle Ages, heterodox applications of crucial tenets of Aristotle’s philosophy led philosophers to explore connections and suggestions that would have not been acceptable for the Stagirite. In this essay, I explore the conflagration of two such Aristotelian (or pseudo-Aristotelian) theses. First, I investigate the notion that prime matter cannot have any properties (as described, among others, by Simplicius and Aquinas); secondly, I take into account the thesis that no property can substantially be predicated of God (John Damascene, Pseudo-Dionysius, Aquinas). In the first half of the article, I reconstruct the tradition surrounding these two tenets and I argue that a non-trivial conflict between these two theses was explored by David of Dinant, in his lost Quaternuli. He claimed that, since both God and prime matter have no properties, then the impossibility of discerning between the two forces us to admit that God is the prime matter of the world, and to identify God as the material cause of the world. In the second part of the essay, I explore whether his association of the Aristotelian denial of prime matter’s properties and the Scholastic denial of the proper predicability of God’s properties is a sound argument, in light of potential objections regarding the homogeneity of the two denials (prima facie, one seems ontological, and the other epistemological), and the tenability of his negative theory of predication.

https://brill.com/view/journals/hpla/25/2/article-p352_5.xml

Paul E. Oppenheimer and Edward N. Zalta, "On Anselm’s Ontological Argument in Proslogion II"

Abstract:

Formulations of Anselm’s ontological argument have been the subject of a number of recent studies. We examine these studies in light of Anselm’s text and (a) respond to criticisms that have surfaced in reaction to our earlier representations of the argument, (b) identify and defend a more refined representation of Anselm’s argument on the basis of new research, and (c) compare our representation of the argument, which analyzes that than which none greater can be conceived as a definite description, to a representation that analyzes it as an arbitrary name.

https://brill.com/view/journals/hpla/25/2/article-p327_4.xml

Brian Ribeiro, "Cicero’s Aspirationalist Radical Skepticism in the Academica"

Abstract:

I defend the view that Cicero writes the Academica from the perspective of an aspirationalist radical skeptic. In section 2 I examine the textual evidence regarding the nature of Cicero’s skeptical stance in the Academica. In section 3 I consider the textual evidence from the Academica for attributing aspirationalism to Cicero. Finally, in section 4 I argue that while aspirationalist radical skepticism is open to a number of philosophical objections, none of those objections is decisive.

https://brill.com/view/journals/hpla/25/2/article-p309_3.xml

Guido Löhrer, "Intellectual Modesty in Socratic Wisdom: Problems of Epistemic Logic and an Intuitionist Solution"

Abstract:

According to Plato’s Apology of Socrates, a humanly wise person is distinguished by her ability to correctly assess the epistemic status and value of her beliefs. She knows when she has knowledge or has mere belief or is ignorant. She makes no unjustified knowledge claims and considers her knowledge to be limited in scope and value. This means: A humanly wise person is intellectually modest. However, when interpreted classically, Socratic wisdom cannot be modest. For in classical epistemic logic, modelling second-order knowledge of knowing something or not, i.e. positive and negative introspection, requires a degree of self-transparency that would at most be attributed to an omniscient and infallible agent. If intellectual modesty is part of Socratic wisdom, we have to look for another epistemic model. I will offer three proposals and argue that an intuitionist reading of the classical concept of knowledge is best suited for this purpose.

https://brill.com/view/journals/hpla/25/2/article-p282_2.xml

Galen Barry and Edith Gwendolyn Nally, "Two Kinds of Mental Conflict in Republic IV"

Abstract:

Plato’s partition argument infers that the soul has parts from the fact that the soul experiences mental conflict. Alasdair MacIntyre poses a dilemma for the argument that highlights an ambiguity in the concept of mental conflict. According to the first sense of conflict, a soul is in conflict when it has desires whose satisfaction conditions are logically incompatible. According to the second sense of conflict, a soul is in conflict when it has desires which are logically incompatible even when they are unsatisfied. The dilemma is therefore this: if the mental conflict is supposed to be the latter kind of conflict, then the partition argument is valid but is likely unsound; if it’s supposed to be the former kind, then the partition argument has true premises but is invalid. We explain this dilemma in detail and defend a dispositionalist solution to it.

https://brill.com/view/journals/hpla/25/2/article-p255_1.xml

HPLA 25.2 (2022) has been published:

https://brill.com/view/journals/hpla/25/2/hpla.25.issue-2.xml

It contains six articles and two reviews:

#introduction #philosophy #philosophyjournals

Hello! I'm History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis, an academic journal dedicated to the history of philosophy. The motto of the journal is 'The history of philosophy should not only be honored as historical documents, but first and foremost be taken seriously from a philosophical point of view.' The journal has been published since 1998; since moving, in 2020, to Brill Publishers, the journal appears twice per year.

I had an account as @hpla@fediscience.org but with @AustralasianJournalPhilosophy and @ajlonline being here, maybe we can make this the home of philosophy journals.